Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We discuss a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The first player(s) acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition.
Introduction
Members of voting bodies may form coalitions for a variety of reasons. In this paper, we assume they do so in order to belong to a coalition with a simple majority of members. Of course, if there are more than a few players, many winning coalitions are possible. We focus on those that, in a sense to be made precise later, are internally compatible, or coherent, and therefore likely to be stable. If there is only one such coalition, we assume that it forms and will indeed be stable.
But if there is more than one coherent coalition, we identify kingmakers, the common members of all coherent coalitions, who collectively decide which coalition will be "king." 2 If they agree on a preferred coherent coalition, we assume it will form and be stable. If they disagree on which coherent coalition to support, their disagreement presumably creates instability.
A leader of a coherent coalition is a member who is the first to be acceptable to all members of the coalition. We show that leaders may or may not be kingmakers.
To identify coherent coalitions-and ultimately kingmakers and leaders-we assume that players strictly rank each other, from best to worst, as coalition partners.
These rankings determine coherent winning coalitions, based on a process whereby players "fall back" on their preferences until one or more winning coalitions forms.
We begin by assuming that the preference rankings of the players are "ordinally single-peaked," but later we show how this assumption can be tightened to "cardinally single-peaked." Such a tightening rules out disconnected coalitions-those that leave out a member along, say, a left-right scale.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we define and illustrate two different kinds of single-peakedness, ordinal and cardinal. We describe in section 3 the fallback model, which determines both how many and which coherent winning coalitions can form.
Assuming first that the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked, we establish bounds on the size of coherent coalitions. We then determine the minimum numbers of players for disconnected coherent coalitions to exist, and to exist uniquely.
In section 5 we show that if there are two or more coherent winning coalitions, there must be at least two kingmakers. There can be two coherent winning coalitions, and two kingmakers, if there are at least 5 players, and three coherent winning coalitions and three kingmakers if there are at least 6 players.
In section 6 we analyze the role that leaders play. Among our findings is that leaders will generally be middle players in a coherent coalition-neither the leftmost nor the rightmost players-but may on occasion be extreme. In section 7 we show that the situation is simpler if preferences are cardinally single-peaked; for example, only middle players can be leaders.
In section 8 we apply the fallback model to coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005 Court, -2009 . Among other things, the model shows how a "tight" 4person liberal coalition was, in the end, displaced by a 5-person conservative coalition.
Besides its use as an explanatory and predictive tool, we suggest in our conclusions, in section 9, how the fallback model might be used for normative purposes.
For example, it can provide a method for selecting a governing coalition, and identifying its kingmakers and leaders, in a parliament.
Preference Profiles and Single-Peakedness
We suppose a simple majority of players, designated 1, 2, . . ., n, is needed to form a winning coalition. We assume that all players strictly rank each other as coalition partners, as illustrated by Example A, where n = 5:
Example A. 1: 2 3 4 5 2: 1 3 4 5 3: 4 5 2 1 4: 3 2 1 5 5: 4 3 2 1.
Each player ranks itself first-that is, it most desires to be included in any majority coalition that forms. In Example A, player 1, after itself, most prefers player 2 as a coalition partner, followed by players 3, 4, and 5 in that order. A complete listing of all players' preferences, as illustrated in Example A, is called a preference profile. 3
The single-peakedness assumption is that the players can be positioned along a line-in order 1, 2, 3, …, n from left to right-so that each player's preference for coalition partners is single-peaked in that it declines monotonically to the left and right of the player's position. (Renaming may be necessary to achieve this configuration.) A preference profile that satisfies this condition is called ordinally single-peaked Kilgour, 2002, 2005) . Such profiles are commonly assumed in spatial models of candidate and party competition and are empirically valid representations of preferences in many political systems.
6
To express ordinal single-peakedness in another way, consider any subset of players along the line; call the left-most member of the subset l and the right-most member r. Then the subset is connected if it is of the form {l, l + 1, …, r}, that is, it contains exactly the players from l to r, inclusive (Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002) .
Thus, a preference profile is ordinally single-peaked if and only if, for each k = 1, 2, …, n, every player's k most-preferred coalition partners, including itself, form a connected set. For example, in Example A, the most-preferred 3-coalitions of players-123 for player 1, 213 for player 2, 345 for player 3, 432 for player 4, and 543 for player 5-are all connected sets. For all other k between 1 and 5, it is easy to verify that the most-preferred k-coalitions of all players are connected, so the preference profile of Example A is ordinally single-peaked.
An ordinally single-peaked preference profile may or may not be geometrically realizable in the sense that the n players can be positioned along the real line to satisfy the following condition: Between any two players, a player's preferred coalition partner is the one closer to its own position. If players can be so positioned, the preference profile is called cardinally single-peaked.
Preferences are cardinally single-peaked when players can be positioned so that each player's preference decreases as distance from its own position increases. To illustrate, assume that 5 players are positioned along a line as follows,
1_2_______________3_____4_5
and that all players perceive these distances in the same way (e.g., they view the gap between players 2 and 3 to be bigger than that between players 3 and 4). Then it is easy to verify that these positions yield the following rankings of coalition partners by each player:
Example B. 1: 2 3 4 5 2: 1 3 4 5 3: 4 5 2 1 4: 5 3 2 1 5: 4 3 2 1
It is easy to verify that the unique FB coalition in Example B is 345, which forms at level 2. Note also that of all minimal winning coalitions in Example B, 345 has the minimum diameter.
In contrast to Example B, the preference profile in Example A is not cardinally single-peaked. To see this, assume that player i is located at position p i on the line. We denote the distance between positions p i and p j by d ij = |p ip j |. From player 3's preference ordering, and because player 4 must be located between players 3 and 5, d 54 < Single-peakedness that is ordinal but not cardinal may be interpreted to mean that, while the players agree on the ordering of their positions, they have different perceptions of the distances between players. In Example A, player 3 and player 4's perceptions may be visualized as follows:
Player 3's perception: 1 2 3 4 5
Player 4's perception: 1 2 3 4 5
For player 3, the distance between it and player 2 is greater than the distance between players 5 and 4, whereas for player 4 the opposite is true, though the two players have the same left-right ordering. If player preferences are not ordinally (and therefore not cardinally) single-peaked, we say they are not single-peaked.
The Fallback Model: Coherent Winning Coalitions
We now turn to issues of coalition formation. First, if there is cardinal information on player positions, it is natural to suppose that the players closest to each other are most likely to join in a coalition. If the players' positions are at p 1 , p 2 , … , p n , the diameter of a nonempty coalition S is the maximum value of |p ip j | for any members i and j in S. We think of any coalition with smaller diameter as more likely, and call the minimal winning coalition with minimum diameter the minimal-diameter coalition.
What if cardinal information on player positions is not available? If the players' rankings of each other as coalition partners are known, then the fallback (FB) process of majority coalition formation is a model. It unfolds as follows: 5 1. Each player considers only its most preferred coalition partner. If two players mutually prefer each other, and this is a majority of players, then this majority coalition forms. The process stops, and we call this coalition a level 1 majority coalition, because only first-choice partners are included.
2. If there is no level 1 majority coalition, each player then considers its two most preferred coalition partners. A coalition then forms consisting of any maximal subset containing a majority of players that mutually accept each other at these two levels.
(There may be more than one such coalition.) The process stops, and we call this a level 2 majority coalition.
3. The players successively descend to lower and lower levels in their rankings until a majority coalition (or coalitions), all of whose members mutually prefer each other, forms for the first time. The process stops. The FB coalitions are those that are inclusion-maximal majority coalition(s)-not contained in any others at this level. 6
What does FB yield in Example A? At level 1, observe that player 1 prefers player 2, and player 2 prefers 1, so we designate 12 as a level 1 coalition, as is also coalition 34. 7
Descending one level, players 3 and 5 find each other acceptable, yielding 35 as a coalition at level 2. Descending one more level, majority coalitions 124 and 234 form for the first time: In these coalitions, each player finds the other two coalition partners acceptable at level 3 (or prior). In summary, we have the following coalitions:
Level 1: 12, 34 Level 2: 35 Level 3: 124, 234
Note that coalitions are listed at the level at which they form, except that subcoalitions forming simultaneously are never listed. Thus, 14, 23, and 24 form at level 3 but do not appear in our listing, because they are proper subsets of coalitions 124 or 234.
Since coalitions 124 and 234 are the first majority coalitions to form, the process stops, rendering FB = {124, 234}. We regard the first majority coalitions to form as the 6 In Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2005) , we called the set of such coalitions FB 1 coalitions, where the subscript 1 indicated majority coalitions that form for the first time. Here we do not consider as coherent any coalitions that form later (i.e., after further descent), so we drop the subscript 1. For a stronger notion of coherence based on a "build-up" model of coalition formation, see Kilgour (2002, 2005) . Build-up coalitions tend to be larger than fallback coalitions, primarily because the build-up process precludes a coalition from forming if any member ranks a nonmember higher than any member. 7 We assume these preferences are truthful, though this need not be the case, as is known from the bargaining context (Brams and Kilgour, 2001) . [Dropped last sentence on political parties.] the coherent majority coalitions; because no majority coalition forms earlier in the descent process, they maximize the minimum ranking of any player for any coalition partner. 8
Disconnected, Simple-Majority, and Grand Coalitions
In this and the next two sections, we assume ordinally single-peaked preference profiles. In section 7 we impose the more stringent requirement of cardinal singlepeakedness and compare the predictions of the ordinal and cardinal models.
We first cover some simple cases. When n = 3, there are two possible ordinally single-peaked preference profiles, Example C. 1: 2 3 2: 1 3 3: 2 1 and its "mirror image," Example C', in which player 2's preference is 2: 3 1. In Example C, the FB coalition 12 forms at level 1, whereas FB coalition 23 forms at level 1 in Example C'. Thus, if n = 3 and preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the FB coalition is either 12 or 23-depending on the preference of player 2-which makes player 2 a "kingmaker" in a sense to be defined in section 4. Note that, when n = 3 and preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the grand coalition cannot be an FB coalition.
. When n = 4, there are six possible ordinally single-peaked preference profiles, one of which is Example D. 1: 2 3 4 2: 1 3 4 3: 4 2 1 4: 3 2 1
The six examples differ according as 2 ranks 1 second (as in Example D), third, or fourth, and as 3 ranks 4 second (as in Example D), third, or fourth. Checking the coalitions that form at each level, we see that the unique FB coalition in Example D is the grand coalition, 1234, at level 3.
To analyze the n = 4 case completely, note that each player's least preferred partner must be either 1 or 4; in particular, 1's must be 4, and 4's must be 1. If 2's and 3's last choices agree, then all players excluding that last choice form a 3-player FB coalition at level 2; otherwise, the FB coalition is the grand coalition, and it forms at level 3. Note that 123 and 234 cannot form simultaneously at level 2, for if they did then player 2 would find all of 1, 3, and 4 acceptable at level 2. In summary, if n = 4, there is one ordinally single-peaked preference profile that produces 123 as FB coalition, one that produces 234, and four that produce 1234.
Example A shows that if n = 5 and the preference profile is ordinally singlepeaked, there may be two FB coalitions. Moreover, one of the FB coalitions (124) may be disconnected: There is a "hole" due to the absence of player 3 from coalition 124.
Whereas players 1 and 2 necessarily rank player 3 higher than player 4 (because of ordinal single-peakedness), player 3 ranks players 2 and 1 at the bottom of its preference order. In particular, player 3 does not consider player 1 acceptable at level 3, which excludes player 3 from FB coalition 124.
It is easy to extend Example A to show that one or more FB coalitions may be disconnected if there are more than 5 players. Moreover, there is an example with n = 7 players with a unique FB coalition that is disconnected (Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2005) .
Our first result establishes the minimum numbers of players associated with disconnected coalitions when preferences are ordinally single-peaked.
Proposition 1. Assume the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. There may be a disconnected FB coalition iff n ≥ 5. A disconnected coalition may be the unique FB coalition iff n ≥ 7.
Proof: As noted above, all FB coalitions are connected if n < 5. Example A yields two FB coalitions, one of which is disconnected, when n = 5. Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2005) produce an example with n = 7 in which a disconnected coalition is the unique FB coalition. They also show that, if n = 5 or 6, any disconnected coalition must form at the same time as the majority coalition that excludes only the two most extreme players.  Proposition 2. Assume the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. If n = 3, FB coalitions must be of size 2. If n = 4, FB coalitions must be of size 3 or 4. If n ≥ 5, FB coalitions must contain at least and at most members. In particular, the grand coalition can be an FB coalition if and only if n = 4. 9
Proof. The cases n = 3 and n = 4 are discussed above. As a majority coalition, it is obvious that an FB coalition must contain at least members. To complete the proof, we show that a FB coalition must form at or prior to depth , which implies that it contains at most players.
Suppose that n ≥ 5, and that d is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ d ≤ . Define the following subsets of players:
In particular, if i S, then i's nd -1 most-preferred coalition partners can exclude only members of S L S U , and therefore must include all members of S.
Note that S contains n -2d players. Select and note that (since n ≥ 5) d < n /4, so that n -2d > n/2, which implies that S is a majority coalition. It follows that, if no FB coalition forms at level less than nd -1, then an FB coalition including all players in S must form at level nd -1. Moreover, the largest coalition that can form at this depth contains players. 
As a corollary to the theorem, note that, if n ≥ 5, an FB coalition must form at or after level and at or prior to level . For instance, if n = 5, an FB coalition must form at either level 2 or 3-but never at level 4, so that the grand coalition is excluded. The bounds on FB coalition size of Proposition 2 are tight. To see this, set and construct S, S L , and S U as in the proof. Note that S has members. Any preference profile in which every player of S prefers every other player of S to any player in S L S U produces FB coalition S at depth . An FB coalition containing players results from a preference profile in which all members of S and all members of S L agree that their d least preferred coalition partners are the members of S U , provided that all except the rightmost member of S prefers every member of S L to some other member of S. In this case, the FB coalition, S S L , has members, and it forms at depth .
We now address the question of how numerous FB coalitions may be.
Proposition 3. Assume the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. If n ≤ 6, there cannot be more than 2 FB coalitions, but if n ≥ 7, there may be more than 2 FB coalitions.
Proof. We have already analyzed completely the cases n = 3 and n = 4. Assume n = 5. Note that either 1 or 5 is last in every player's preference order, that 5 is last in 1's, and that 1 is last in 5's. Suppose that four of the five preference orders end in 5. Then the first four positions in the preference orders of the players other than 5 constitute a preference profile for n = 4, for which there can is a unique FB coalition. Now suppose that 5 is last in exactly three players' preference orders. Then, unless there is an FB coalition of three players, including player 1, that is an FB coalition at level 3. Also, unless there is a prior FB coalition, 234 is an FB coalition at level 3. As there are no FB coalitions including 5, and at most one including 1, this exhausts all possibilities. The argument is symmetric if the last preference of either three or four players is 1. This completes the proof for n = 5. The reasoning for n = 6 is similar.
Now consider the following 7-player example:
Example E. 1: 2 3 4 5 6 | 7 2: 1 3 4 5 6 | 7 3: 2 1 4 5 6 | 7 4: 5 6 3 2 1 | 7 5: 6 7 4 3 2 | 1 6: 7 5 4 3 2 | 1 7: 6 5 4 3 2 | 1
When the level of descent reaches level 5, the three FB coalitions 1234, 2345, and 3456 all form. This example can easily be extended to more than n = 7 players. 
The maximum number of FB coalitions increases with the number of players. As
Example F demonstrates, four FB coalitions can form at level when n = 11.
Example F. 1: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | 10 11 2: 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | 10 11 3: 2 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 | 10 11 4: 3 2 1 5 6 7 8 9 | 10 11 5: 4 3 2 1 6 7 8 9 | 10 11 6: 7 8 9 5 4 3 2 1 | 10 11 7: 8 9 10 6 5 4 3 2 | 1 11 8: 9 10 11 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1 9: 10 11 8 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1 10: 11 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1 11: 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1
It is not difficult to ascertain that the FB coalitions in Example F are 123456, 234567, 345678, and 456789.
Examples E and F are members of a family of preference profiles of increasing size. We next show that, for any integer k = 3, 4, 5, …, there exists an ordinally single-peaked preference profile that produces k FB coalitions. These profiles require n = 4k -5 players, which we conjecture is the minimum for k FB coalitions. 10 Proposition 4. Let k ≥ 3 be an integer. Then there is an ordinally single-peaked preference profile with n = 4k -5 players in which k FB coalitions, all of size s = 2k, form at level l* = 3k -3.
Proof. We define the preference of the n = 4k -5 players. Let x i (l) be player i's l th most-preferred coalition partner) for l = 1, 2, ..., 4k − 6 = n − 1. First, set
x 1 (l) = l + 1 and x 4k − 5 (l) = 4k − 5 − l for l = 1, 2, ..., 4k − 6.
For i = 2, 3, ..., 2k − 3, define
x i (l) = i − l for l = 1, 2, ..., i − 1, and
x i (l) = l + 1 for l = i, i + 1, ..., 4k − 4.
For i = 2k − 2, 2k, 2k + 1, ..., 3k − 5, let
x i (l) = i + l for l = 1, 2, ..., k − 1,
x i (l) = i + k − l − 1 for l = k, k + 1, ..., i + k − 2, and
Finally, for i = 3k − 4, 3k − 3, ..., 4k − 6 = n − 1, set
x i (l) = i + l for l = 1, 2, ..., n − i − 1 and
x i (l) = i − l for l = n − i, n − i + 1, ..., 4k − 6.
10 More precisely, we conjecture that if n ≥ 5, then a maximum of FB coalitions can form.
The previous analysis established that the conjecture is true when n = 5 (k = 2) and n = 9 (k = 3), which are the values for which (n + 3)/4 is an integer. Example F demonstrates that k = 4 coalitions can form when n = 11; one aspect of our conjecture is that there can be at most 3 FB coalitions when n < 11.
Next we determine the FB coalitions that form, given this preference profile. Note that for any i ≤ 2k − 3, player i's l* = 3k − 3 most-preferred coalition partners include 1, 2, ..., i − 1 and i + 1, i + 2, ..., 3k − 3. Now, for any fixed j satisfying j = 1, 2, ..., or k, we
show that an FB coalition {j, j + 1, ..., j + 2k − 1} forms at level l*. First, j ≤ 2k − 3, so players j, j + 1, ..., 2k − 3 find all players in {1, 2, ..., 3k − 3} acceptable at level l*.
Now consider any player i where 2k − 2 ≤ i ≤ j + 2k − 2. (Note: In the case j = k and i = 3k − 2, a special argument is required. We give it in the next paragraph.) Player
..., i − 2k + 2. Therefore, each player i in the indicated range finds all players j, j + 1, ..., 2k − 2, 2k − 1, ..., j + 2k − 2, j + 2k − 1, ..., 3k − 3 at level l*. This shows that the coalition {j, j + 1, ..., j + 2k − 2} forms at level l*.
For the case j = k, the last player in the coalition {j, j + 1, ..., j + 2k − 1} is i = 3k − 3. Consideration of x i (d) in this case shows that player i = 3k − 3 finds all players in {k, k + 1, ..., 4k − 5} acceptable at level l*. 
Kingmakers in Fallback Coalitions
So far we have shown that only when n ≥ 5 is it possible for there to be more than one FB coalition, whose common members we call kingmakers: They determine which, if any, FB coalition forms.
In Example A, players 2 and 4 are common to FB coalitions 124 and 234, but they disagree on which of the two FB coalitions they prefer. Player 2 prefers coalition 124, because it ranks noncommon player 1 above noncommon player 3, whereas player 4 prefers coalition 234 because of the opposite ranking. This split of the kingmakers on which FB coalition they prefer suggests that either is possible, leaving the outcome indeterminate. Such indeterminacy may lead to a factional battle between players 2 and 4 over which FB coalition will prevail.
Such instability is not always the case, as the following 5-player example illustrates:
Example G. 1: 2 3 4 5 2: 3 4 1 5 3: 4 2 1 5 4: 3 5 2 1 5: 4 3 2 1
The coalitions that form at each level are as follows: There are two kingmakers in both 5-player examples, A and G. Each preference profile is ordinally but not cardinally single-peaked. 11 In principle, it is possible for exactly one player to be common to two majority coalitions (e.g., player 3 is the unique common member of 123 and 345), but this can never happen under FB with ordinally single-peaked preferences, as shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Assume the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. Any two distinct FB coalitions must have at least two common members (kingmakers).
Proof. Two distinct majority coalitions must have at least one member, say i, in common. Suppose that there are no other common members. Then in order for i to find the n -1 other members of the two coalitions acceptable, the FB descent must go to level n -1, at which level the grand coalition forms. Moreover, the grand coalition is the unique FB coalition by the inclusion-maximal condition. This contradiction shows that there must be at least two common members.  As shown by Examples A and G, kingmakers may agree or disagree on which FB coalition is preferable.
We have already noted that, if n < 5, the FB coalition is unique and, therefore, there are no kingmakers. We next show that as the maximum number of kingmakers is two when n = 5, and more than two when n > 5.
Proposition 6. Assume the preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. If n = 5, there can be at most two kingmakers. If n > 5, there may be more than 2 kingmakers.
Proof. When n = 5, there may be two FB coalitions (Examples A and E) and, therefore, at least two kingmakers (Proposition 5). For there to be 3 kingmakers when n = 5, the FB coalitions would have to have four members, and each of the overlapping members would have to find all five players acceptable. But this occurs only at level 4, and produces the grand coalition. Proposition 2 shows that any FB coalition is smaller than the grand coalition if n ≥ 5. Now consider the following 6-player example:
Example H. 1: 2 3 4 5 | 6 2: 3 4 1 5 | 6 3: 2 1 4 5 | 6 4: 3 2 5 1 | 6 5: 6 4 3 2 | 1 6: 5 4 3 2 | 1
It is easy to verify that at level 4 in the FB descent (one level from the bottom)-shown by the vertical bars in each player's ranking-FB coalitions 1234 and 2345 form and have 3 common members (kingmakers), 2, 3, and 4. This 6-player example can readily be extended to more than 6 players.  There may be more FB coalitions and, therefore, more kingmakers as the number of players increases. In Example E, where the FB coalitions are 1234, 2345, and 3456, note that player 3 is a "full kingmaker," as it belongs to all three FB coalitions. Because players 2 and 4 each belong to two of the three FB coalitions, they are "partial kingmakers." Subsequently, we will focus on full kingmakers (or just kingmakers), who are common members of every FB coalition.
The family of examples described by Proposition 4 produces k = 3, 4, 5, … FB coalitions at level 3k -3 = 6, 9, 12,. . . using n = 4k -5 = 7, 11, 15 ,. . . players. It is easy to verify that these FB coalitions include k = 3, 4, 5, … kingmakers. Note that when k increases by 1, n increases by 4, the FB coalitions increase by 2 members, form 3 levels later, and include 1 more kingmaker. These increases are consistent with the conclusions of Proposition 2, in which the maximum level of FB coalition formation increases at about ¾ of the rate of increase of the number of players.
When there are multiple FB coalitions, we ask whether all kingmakers, who belong to all FB coalitions, agree on a preferred coalition. If so, we call it stable, because it will be rational for the kingmakers to implement it. By the same token, if there is only one FB majority coalition, it will also be stable.
It is useful to refine the concept of stability to take account of size when there is only one FB coalition. Following Riker's (1962) size principle, we hypothesize that the larger a unique FB coalition, the less stable it will be.
In a 3-player system, there is only one FB coalition, which depends on the preference of the middle player (see Examples C and C'). In section 4 we suggested that pivotal role that the middle player assumes is akin to that of kingmaker, even though there cannot be multiple FB coalitions in these examples. coalition 1234 to coalition 2345 to coalition 3456, and kingmaker 4 has exactly the opposite preference. The preferences of players 2 and 5, who may also have input as partial kingmakers, make agreement even less likely, because player 2 prefers coalition 1234 to 2345, and player 5 prefers 3456 to 2345. Hence, whichever of these FB coalitions forms, kingmakers will be unhappy, suggesting that any winning coalition will be unstable.
Leaders in Fallback Coalitions
Each member of an FB coalition has an acceptability level, the lowest level at which the member is acceptable to all other members of the coalition. A leader of an FB coalition is a member of the coalition whose acceptability level is minimal. In Example A (5 players), the leader of coalition 124 is player 2 at level 2 (players 1 and 4 become acceptable to each other only at level 3), and the leader of coalition 234 is player 3 at level 2 (players 2 and 4 become acceptable to each other only at level 3). While player 2 is also a kingmaker, player 3 is not.
Note that the leaders in each of these FB coalitions are middle players-they are neither the leftmost nor the rightmost players in each coalition. (We call the leftmost and rightmost player extreme players.) Likewise in Example D (4 players), wherein 1234 is the unique FB coalition, the leaders are the two middle players, 2 and 3, which become acceptable at level 2. In Example G (5 players), the unique leader in FB coalition 234 is middle player 3 at level 1.
Despite this preponderance of middle players as leaders, extreme players may also be leaders, as illustrated by Example G, where players 2 (middle) and 3 (extreme) share leadership in FB coalition 123 at level 2. A similar case occurs for FB coalition 1234 in Example E.
While an extreme player may be a leader, most of our examples suggest that middle players are more likely to be leaders. Our earlier 3-player case (Example C) is instructive in understanding the leadership advantage that middle players enjoy. In this example, the unique FB coalition is 12, with both players 1 and 2 leaders at level 1. If player 2's preference were 2: 3 1 (Example C'), 23 would be the FB coalition, and player 2 would still be a leader, this time in coalition with player 3.
Under ordinal single-peakedness, player 2 may favor player 1 (Example C) or player 3 (Example C'). But the latter players' preferences are fixed, and the consequence is that player 2 is a leader whenever either of the other players is.
What relationship, if any, exists between leaders and kingmakers? The answer seems quite murky when preferences are ordinally single-peaked-leaders may or may not be kingmakers. In section 7 we investigate consequences of the more stringent assumption of cardinal single-peakedness on FB coalitions and leaders.
FB Coalitions When Preferences Are Cardinally Single-Peaked
Our previous propositions apply when the players' preference profile is ordinally single-peaked. We begin by tightening the latter assumption-assuming preferences to be cardinally rather than ordinally single-peaked-and show that multiple coalitions may still form, but they are always connected and their leaders are always middle players.
Recall Example B:
Here, preferences are cardinally single-peaked, because they decline with distance if the players are positioned along a line as follows:
1_2_______________3_____4_5
At level 1, coalitions 12 and 45 form, and at level 2 FB coalition 345 emerges and is the unique FB coalition.
It is known (Brams, Jones, Kilgour, 2002) that when preferences are cardinally single-peaked, coalitions must be connected. Such preferences might be expected to preclude multiple FB coalitions, but this is not the case.
Proposition 7. Assume preferences are cardinally single-peaked. If n < 5, there is one FB coalition. If n ≥ 5, there may be more than one FB coalition.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is implied by Proposition 4, because cardinally single-peaked preferences are necessarily ordinally single-peaked. Now consider the following 5-player example, in which the exact positions of players on the line segment from 0 to 13 are specified in parentheses:
The positions of the players imply the following preference profile:
1: 2 3 4 5 2: 1 3 4 5 3: 4 2 1 5 4: 3 2 5 1 5: 4 3 2 1
It is easy to check that two FB coalitions, 123 and 234, form at level 3. This example can readily be extended to show that more than one FB coalition can also form when n > 5. 
In Example I, it is noteworthy that the two FB coalitions and the two minimum diameter winning coalitions are the same. Both 123 and 234 have diameter (width) 5. It can be shown that the minimal-diameter winning coalition is an FB coalition, but there may be others. For example, note that the preference profile of Example I would be unchanged if the 4 were shifted slightly to the right or the left, increasing or decreasing the diameter of 234, but after such a perturbation 123 and 234 would both remain FB coalitions.
Proposition 8. Assume preferences are cardinally single-peaked. Then any leader of an FB coalition is a middle player of that coalition. 12
Proof. The extreme players of an FB coalition approve of each other at a lower level of descent than do the middle players, because the distance from middle to extreme players is less than the distance from one extreme player to the other. Therefore, the middle players of the FB coalition will be approved of earlier in the fallback process, ensuring that one or more of them will be leader(s) of the FB coalition, to the exclusion of any more extreme players. 
To summarize our findings on the effects of cardinal single-peakedness, (i) there may be more than one FB coalition if n ≥ 5 and (ii) leaders of FB coalitions are always middle players. We next illustrate the FB model, applying it to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. We compare its predictions with those of a one-dimensional scaling model, which forces preferences to be cardinally single-peaked.
Coalition Formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: An Illustration
In the November issues of the Harvard Law Review each year, statistics are given on the percent agreement of each justice with every other justice on "full-opinion decisions" involving "substantial legal reasoning" in the previous term of the U.S. 12 The only cardinally single-peaked preference profiles with 3 players are Examples C and C'; there, the FB coalitions, 12 and 23, do not have a middle player. But as we suggested earlier, player 2, who can determine whether a left-center or right-center coalition forms, may be considered a kingmaker. Because player 2 is the first to be approved by both other players (players 1 and 3), player 2 would seem to qualify as a leader, too. Perhaps surprisingly, a liberal 4-person coalition forms at level 3 before two different conservative 4-person coalitions emerge at levels 4 and 5. This suggests that the four liberal justices have more affinity for each other than the more conservative justices; 14 only at level 6 does a 5-person conservative and a 5-person middle-of-the-road FB coalition emerge.
The preferences of the nine justices, as given by their agreement rankings, are neither ordinally nor cardinally single-peaked. Note, for example, that Thomas's ranking and Stevens's ranking are not diametrically opposed-and neither are the rankings of any other pair of justices-as must be true of some pair in any ordinally or cardinally single- 14 In fact, the four liberals form a build-up (BU) coalition at level 3, because their members all rank each other highest Kilgour, 2002, 2005) , which is not true of the two conservative 4-person coalitions that form at levels 4 and 5. For example, Kennedy ranks Breyer and Souter, who are not in either of these conservative coalitions, ahead of Scalia, who is in both. Because the liberals rank only each other highest, their 4-person coalition is tighter than the 4-person conservative coalitions, wherein some members rank outside justices higher. peaked preference profile. Clearly, the Martin-Quinn scaling of the justices, which presupposes that their preferences are cardinally single-peaked, does not fully account for their voting behavior. Edelman and Chen (2007) provide evidence that a single dimension, like that given by the MQ scores, is insufficient to explain the voting behavior of the justices, but their focus is less on coalition formation and more on the power of individual justices to alter outcomes; see also Kaniovski and Leech (2009) , who also analyze the power of justices on the Supreme Court. To test the validity of the MQ scores as predictors of coalitions, we calculated the 5-person coalition with the minimal diameter-that is, the coalition that minimizes the distance between its extreme members (see section 3)-which necessarily comprises five ideologically adjacent justices. This coalition turns out to be the 4-person liberal coalition, which forms at level 3, plus Kennedy; its diameter is the difference between Kennedy's positive MQ score (on the right) and Stevens's negative MQ score Much rarer is the 5-person middle-of-the-road coalition of (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Souter) that is also predicted by the fallback model at level 6. 15 In fact, this coalition formed only twice (2.8 percent of the 5-4 cases) over the 4-year period of the natural court.
We conclude that neither the 5-person minimum-diameter liberal coalition, nor the middle-of-the-road FB coalition, is a good predictor of 5-4 Supreme Court decisions.
However, the second 5-person conservative FB coalition is a good predictor, so it behooves us to look more closely at which of the two FB coalition at level 6 is more likely to form.
Observe that Alito, Kennedy, and Roberts are the common members of the two FB coalitions. This renders these justices the kingmakers, who can decide which coalition they prefer. Since the middle-of-the-road coalition hardly ever formed, the real contest is between the liberal and the conservative coalitions. Because Kennedy, the most liberal of the conservatives, prefers Roberts and Alito to Breyer and Souter, and Scalia and Thomas to Ginsburg and Stevens, the FB model predicts he will side with the conservatives. 16 Among not only the kingmakers but also the two other members of the conservative 5-person coalition, Roberts, the chief justice, is the only member acceptable at level 2 and, hence, the leader (underscored); 17 the four other members become acceptable only at level 3 (Alito), level 4 (Kennedy), level 5 (Scalia), or level 6 (Thomas) to all the other coalition members. This makes Roberts a natural bridge among the members, supporting the frequently made observation that not only did the conservative coalition hold sway in 2005-2009 but also that Roberts was the driving force behind it falsely, based on the agreement-score rankings-that the justices' preferences are cardinally single-peaked, hiding the complexity of the their rankings of each other as coalition partners. 16 Note that Kennedy's preference is not unequivocal: He does not prefer all the conservatives to all the liberals but has pairwise preferences (e.g., prefers Roberts and Alito to Breyer and Souter, and Scalia and Thomas to Ginsburg and Stevens). Naturally, the facts and nature of a case matter, causing Kennedy, on occasion, to side with the liberals. 17 Roberts is also the leader of the fallback coalition that includes Breyer and Souter, because he is the first member of this coalition to become acceptable to all the other members (albeit only at level 5). (Stearns, 2008; Toobin, 2008; Liptak, 2009 Liptak, , 2010 . He, along with Alito and Scalia, is a middle member of it, which is anchored on the left by Kennedy and on the right by Thomas.
The fallback model gives insight into why the liberals, by and large, failed. The tight 4-person liberal coalition that formed at level 3 could not attract a fifth member at either level 4 or level 5, when different conservative 4-person subcoalitions emerged.
Critically, the liberal coalition's best prospect, Kennedy, ranked the extreme liberals, Ginsberg and Stevens, below the extreme conservatives, Scalia and Thomas, so it is hardly surprising that Kennedy more often sided with the conservatives.
Conclusions
We assume in the FB model that players strictly rank each other as potential coalition partners. FB then identifies coherent majority coalitions, in which all members find each other acceptable for the first time in the descent process.
If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, FB coalitions, from simple majority to grand-but grand only if n = 2 or 4-may form. In general, the number of possible FB coalitions increases with n, the number of players, for which we gave a formula. We also gave a formula for the maximum level at which an FB coalition must form.
If n ≥ 5 and two or more FB coalitions form, they will have at least two common members; moreover, these coalitions may be disconnected. We called the common members kingmakers, because they determine which FB coalition will actually be chosen.
An FB coalition is stable if it is unique or-if there is more than one FB coalition-the kingmakers agree on which coalition they prefer. If the kingmakers disagree, there is likely to be a struggle, rendering unstable any FB coalition that forms.
The leader(s) of an FB coalition are the first player(s) to be acceptable to all its members. If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, leaders are usually middle players in a coalition-neither the leftmost nor the rightmost members-but they can be extreme members as well. If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, however, leaders are always middle players.
The U.S. Supreme Court, 2005 Court, -2009 , featured a 5-member conservative coalition, which was an FB coalition and was decisive in almost half the cases with 5-4 decisions.
This coalition is predicted by the FB model but not by by Martin-Quinn scores, which presume that the justices can be ordered along a single dimension although their preferences, based on their agreement scores, are not ordinally or cardinally singlepeaked. In addition, the FB model provided insight into the build-up of nonwinning coalitions into winning coalitions, especially the predominant conservative coalition that has recently dominated the Court.
Insofar as players explicitly or implicitly rank coalition partners, one can test, empirically, propositions in this paper in parliamentary democracies. While it is not obvious how one can operationalize kingmakers, who often play hidden roles, it should be possible to identify FB coalitions and leaders.
One can determine, for example, which coalitions of parties form a governmentor compete to form one-and identify who their leaders are (usually the heads of the largest parties, who tend to be centrists). One can also ascertain when coalitions are disconnected, as has happened on occasion in countries like Germany and Israel when the large left and right parties combined, leaving out small parties in the middle.
FB could be used for the normative purpose of selecting a governing coalition and its leaders. This would seem a serious alternative to the haggling and infightingsometimes lasting over weeks or months-that undermines coalition formation in some parliamentary systems. While institutional reforms of this kind are not unknown (Brams, 2008) , it would be wise to precede the adoption of FB with empirical studies that help to gauge its probable effects.
